On 9 July 2008, India formally submitted the Safeguards Agreement to the IAEA. [78] This development came after Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh returned from the 34th G8 summit in Hokkaido, Japan, where he met with US President George W. Bush. [79] On June 19, 2008, the media reported that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh threatened to resign if the Left Front, whose support for the ruling United Progressive Alliance was crucial to proving its majority in the Indian parliament, continued to oppose the nuclear deal, and he described his position as irrational and reactionary. [80] According to The Hindu, Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee said in his previous statement: “I cannot bind the government if we lose our majority,”[81] implying that the United Progressive Alliance government would not sign any agreement with the IAEA if it lost the majority in an opposition-initiated no-confidence motion or if it did not have a confidence vote in the Indian parliament, after the president asked him to prove his majority. On July 8, 2008, Prakash Karat announced that the Left Front was withdrawing its support for the government over the government`s decision to pursue the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. The Left Front had been a strong advocate of not moving forward with this agreement by invoking national interests. [82] 25. July 2008: The IAEA Secretariat informs Member States of the India-specific safeguards agreement. The term “gold standard” was coined at the very end of the George W.

Bush administration, when the U.S.-UAE agreement was signed in January 2009, and it was declared the new standard for nuclear cooperation agreements, although several subsequent agreements did not meet the additional standard under the Obama administration. A 2011 letter from the Obama administration to the Capitol abandoned the idea of a unified 123-agreement approach and advocated a case-by-case approach in future negotiations. (See ACT, March 2012). The Trump administration has been even less clear about its position on gold standard regulations. This has been particularly important in the ongoing negotiations on an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia 123. The Prevention of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2019 would require the president to report to Congress any credible evidence suggesting that the cooperating government cannot pursue an inherently peaceful program or cases in which the cooperating country has violated international standards for the use of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the draft law requires information on whether the host country has committed to refrain from enrichment and reprocessing and whether it has committed to implement an additional protocol to the country`s IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The APP is an addendum to a country`s safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which gives the Agency more authority and freedom to act to fulfill its assurance and verification mandate. The importance of including the requirement for the AP is that it would ensure that a country cooperating with the United States provides the IAEA with access and information on all its activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle. This would allow the IAEA to conduct short-term inspections, conduct additional access visits and collect environmental samples beyond designated sites where deemed necessary. Critics call the terms of the deal too beneficial for India and lack sufficient safeguards to prevent New Delhi from continuing to produce nuclear weapons.

“We will send fresh fuel to India or allow others to send it – including yellowcake and lightly enriched uranium – which will free up Indian domestic fuel sources that will be used exclusively to make far more bombs than they would otherwise have been able to make,” said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Center for Non-Proliferation Policy Education. a not-for-profit organization dedicated to raising awareness of proliferation issues. While India has promised that any U.S. aid to its civilian nuclear power program will not benefit its nuclear weapons program, experts say India could use imported nuclear fuel to power its civilian energy program while diverting its own nuclear fuel for weapons production. New Delhi has done similar things in the past; India claimed to have used nuclear technology for civilian purposes until its first nuclear weapons test in 1974. A congressional research service report (PDF) on the agreement states, “There is no measure in this global partnership to curb India`s nuclear weapons program.” Of course, this legal distinction is less pronounced at the international level, with congressional executive agreements and Article II treaties being considered equivalent. However, it is important to note that the conclusion of an agreement 123 does not oblige the United States to export nuclear technology; it only allows such exports. . . .